Over the next decade, systems which create and store digital records of people’s movements through public space will be woven inextricably into the fabric of everyday life. We are already starting to see such systems now, and there will be many more in the near future.

Here are some examples you might already have used or read about:

• Monthly transit swipe-cards
• Electronic tolling devices (FastTrak, EZpass, congestion pricing)
• Cellphones
• Services telling you when your friends are nearby
• Searches on your PDA for services and businesses near your current location
• Free Wi-Fi with ads for businesses near the network access point you’re using
• Electronic swipe cards for doors
• Parking meters you can call to add money to, and which send you a text message when your time is running out

These systems are marvellously innovative, and they promise benefits ranging from increased convenience to transformative new kinds of social interaction.

Unfortunately, these systems pose a dramatic threat to locational privacy.

And today, the New York Times has an op-ed by Adam Cohen lamenting the threats to locational privacy in our contemporary technological ecosystem:

A little-appreciated downside of the technology revolution is that, mainly without thinking about it, we have given up “locational privacy.” Even in low-tech days, our movements were not entirely private. The desk attendant at my gym might have recalled seeing me, or my colleagues might have remembered when I arrived. Now the information is collected automatically and often stored indefinitely.

It’s good to see this attention to locational privacy, but it’s equally important to recognize that these threats aren’t new: I’ve been blogging and advocating for attention to privacy in public, privacy on the roads, and locational privacy for a number of years now (and I’m certainly not the only one). I’ve also published about particular threats to privacy on the roads (here and here), and tried (with limited success) to engage with designers of new vehicle-technologies to design privacy into the new protocols.

I’m thrilled to see the EFF draw renewed attention to locational privacy. I just hope they’re not too late to start advocating for change…

This post is an attempt to collect and organize some thoughts on how the rise of so-called Web 2.0 technologies bear on privacy and surveillance studies. After presenting a few examples of unintended consequences of Web 2.0 that bear on privacy and surveillance, I will introduce the term “netaveillance,” which might provide a useful concept around which a more robust theory of surveillance about the Web 2.0 phenomena might be built.

The rhetoric surrounding the Web 2.0 movement presents certain cultural claims about media, identity, and technology. It suggests that everyone can and should use new Internet technologies to organize and share information, to interact within communities, and to express oneself. It promises to empower creativity, to democratize media production, and to celebrate the individual while also relishing the power of collaboration and social networks. Websites such as Flickr, Wikipedia, del.icio.us, MySpace, and YouTube are all part of this apparent second-generation Internet phenomenon, which has spurred a variety of new services and communities – and venture capitalist dollars.

This cartoon of a room full of people arguing at a cocktail party after someone mentioned the provocative theories of Marshall McLuhan reminds me of today’s emotional debates over the relative impact – and even the very existence – of Web 2.0. Many hail Web 2.0 as the “new wisdom of the web,” and “a new cultural force based on mass collaboration,” while others deride it as merely a marketing jingo, “amoral,” and even an extension of Marxist ideology.

This last notion, the relationship between Web 2.0 and Marxism, was suggested by Andrew Keen, one of the loudest provocateurs of the Web 2.0 ideology. Keen has received considerable criticism for making comparisons between the Web 2.0 meme and Marxism, but, between the vitriol, he does make some valid points about the utopianism and solipsism that seems to underlie much of the Web 2.0 discourse. In particular, he criticizes the fervent commitment to technological progress:

The ideology of the Web 2.0 movement was perfectly summarized at the Technology Education and Design (TED) show in Monterey, last year, when Kevin Kelly, Silicon Valley’s über-idealist and author of the Web 1.0 Internet utopia Ten Rules for The New Economy, said:“Imagine Mozart before the technology of the piano. Imagine Van Gogh before the technology of affordable oil paints. Imagine Hitchcock before the technology of film. We have a moral obligation to develop technology.”

But where Kelly sees a moral obligation to develop technology, we should actually have–if we really care about Mozart, Van Gogh and Hitchcock–a moral obligation to question the development of technology. [emphasis added]

This moral obligation to question the development of technology compels Keen to identify some of the unintended consequences of the emergence of Web 2.0 infrastructures, including the flattening of culture, the overabundance of amateur authors and producers, and narcissism run wild.

As I begin to study the Web 2.0 meme from the perspective of privacy and surveillance theory, a different set of unintended consequences emerges, including shifts in the flow of personal information that might threaten personal privacy in ways much more damaging than Keen’s concern that content is now made and distributed by mere amateurs instead of honed professionals.

For example, Web 2.0 applications often rely on rich metadata to create value in information, such as the geotagging of images uploaded to Flickr. While it might be useful and fun to have locational data automatically associated with your images, considerable privacy concerns emerge as an externality. For instance, law enforcement officials can simply search for all photos online matching the location & timing of a certain political rally in order to broaden their ability to keep records of who was present. Or, combined with the development of facial recognition technologies with shared online photos, stalkers (or other annoying folks) might soon be able to search for a certain person’s face, and discover the GPS coordinates of the coffee shop they seem to be pictured in every Tuesday morning. Someone even developed a tool, FlickerInspector, to facilitate this kind of mining of the datastreams users leave behind on Flickr.

Of course, one doesn’t need a fancy application like FlickerInspector to reap the benefits of the new datastreams facilitated by Web 2.0 applications. Inherent in Web 2.0 evangelism is an overall faith in the network to be the processing platform: users are encouraged to put as much of their lives as possible online, to divulge and share their personal lives, their professional development, their favorite websites, their music, their friendships, their appointments, and even where they’ve connected to wi-fi. If you know a person’s “handle” on one Web 2.0 site (“michaelzimmer” at del.icio.us), you probably can find them on many more (Plazes, LibraryThing).

The prevalence of sharing so many details of one’s life through various Web 2.0 and social networking sites, and the relative ease of finding users across these services, leads to a second key externality: the rise of amateur data-mining. Fueled by the power and reach of Web search engines, it seems anyone can now engage in the kind of tracking and data-mining of user’s online activities that was once possibly only by the most powerful of computer systems.

An interesting case of amateur data mining made possible through Web 2.0 involves “Don, the camera thief.” The blog BoingBoing posted a story of a woman who lost her camera while on vacation, but was contacted by the family who happened to find it. Unfortunately – and oddly – the family who found it refused to return the camera because their child liked it so much. BoingBoing thought the actions by the finders of the camera were “shameful.” A few days after posting this, BoingBoing received an e-mail from someone who claimed his name was “Don Deveny,” purportedly a Canadian lawyer, who implied that the post was illegal and that BoingBoing was liable for making it. The folks at BoingBoing doubted the legitimacy of the email (the word “lawyer” was misspelled, for example), and decided to see what he could find out about “Don.”

They first contacted many of the law societies in Canada, none of whom had any record of a “Don Deveny” licensed to practice law in Canada. (by the way, it is illegal to pretend to be a lawyer). From their e-mail exchange, they were able to isolate the writer’s real e-mail address from the message headers, and through a Google search, located other pages that contain that address. That led them to a profile page for a user of the website called “Canada Kick A**” who shared the very same e-mail address. That profile page had a different person’s name (perhaps “Don’s” real name?), and also listed a location and profession for the user (he’s not a lawyer). It didn’t take much to figure out (or at least get a better clue) as to who this e-mailer was, and his profile page on a Web 2.0-inspired discussion board made it much easier.

Readers of BoingBoing did some amateur data mining of their own: a commenter at the original camera owner’s blog seemed to share many of the same sentiments of “Don,” along with many of the same spelling errors. This commenter used a different screen name, but when asked to identify himself, also said he was a lawyer. Another reader then discovered that a user with that same screen name recently bid on memory cards at eBay that would have been used in the stolen camera. More amateur data mining ensued, and discovered another user profile at a different discussion forum with the same user name and same “favorite sites” listed in the signature file. And this page included a photo of the user: Is this “Don” our camera thief?

Another example of the ease of amateur data mining with the help of Web 2.0 services is the outing of Lonelygirl15. Lonelygirl15 was the mysterious girl leaving video confessions on YouTube, garnering a huge following of devoted fans, yet know one knew who she was or if they were really just a kid’s video diary or perhaps a large hoax or advertising campaign. After some amateur data mining, the truth came out:
A reader was surfing an article on Lonelygirl15 at a random website when he came across a comment that linked to a private MySpace page that was allegedly that of the actress who plays Lonelygirl15. Since the profile was set to “private,” very little information one could glean from the page. However, when he queried Google for that particular MySpace user name, “jeessss426,” he was able to access Google’s cache from the page a few months ago when it was still public. A lot of the details of the girl’s background quickly emerged: She was an actress from a small city in New Zealand who had moved to Burbank recently to act. The name on the profile was “Jessica Rose.” When he happened to query Google image search for “Jessica Rose New Zealand” he was instantly rewarded with two cached thumbnail photos of Lonelygirl15, a.k.a. Jessica Rose, from a New Zealand talent agency that had since removed the full size versions. A search on Yahoo for “jeessss426” also turned up various pictures from her (probably forgotten) ImageShack photo sharing account. Lonelygirl15 was revealed.

Little effort was needed to link up the various e-mails, user names, personal data flows, and photos shared across blogs, discussion forums and other Web 2.0-style sites to track down “Don the camera thief” or “LoneyGirl15”. Moving more and more of our activities to Web 2.0 makes it harder to remain anonymous, and the myth of “security through obscurity” seems to be disappearing as various crumbs of our true identity are being scattered across the Web 2.0 landscape.

A final externality of Web 2.0 relates to a new form of informational voyeurism that these platforms enable. While Web 2.0 sites have enjoyed incredible growth and heavy viral participation, only a small fraction of overall users actually use the services to upload content – the vast majority just likes to lurk and watch. According to one report, only 0.16 percent of YouTube’s total traffic is made up of users who upload videos. Similarly, only 0.2 percent of Flickr’s regular users are there to upload photos. And slick new tools emerge daily to facilitate the surveillance and voyeurism of people’s daily activities. For example, “feeds” on Facebook allow users to be notified immediately when a friend updates their profile (changing their mood, their friend list, their relationship status, etc), dodgeball helps users find friends (and unknown friends of friends) within a 10 block radius of their present location, DiggSpy allows real-time monitoring of user’s activities on the popular news ranking site Digg, and Twitter has quickly emerged as the hottest new voyeuristic service, allowing users to share text snippets of their day-to-day activities, and monitor others’ streams of the mundane details of their lives (such as “a whole gang of women with dogs just walked past my window”).

What seems to be emerging is a new form of voyeuristic surveillance of people’s everyday lives, fueled by Web 2.0. This has been referred to varyingly as “peer-to-peer surveillance” or even as a new kind of “participatory panopticon.” Yet these terms – and the theories embedded within them – seem insufficient to fully grasp the significance of the emergence of this new voyeurism of the mundane. Surveillance, of course, implies the “watching over” of subjects from above, with an explicit power relationship between the watchers and those placed under its gaze. Trying to describe surveillance as “peer-to-peer” suggests a flattening of the power relationship that is counter to its very definition. Similarly, the notion of a “participatory panopticon” is at the same time redundant and contradictory. Foucault revealed how panoptic power becomes internalized by the subjects, thus, they necessarily “participate” in their own subjugation. Yet the top-down power relationship within the panoptic structure remains. The participation by the subjects does not make them equal with the watchers. Yet the informational voyeurism associated with Web 2.0 seems to imply a balance between the users: one shares their data streams in order to improve the overall worth of the network, coupled with the presumption that they’ll be able to observe and leverage others’ streams as well.

This notion resembles that of “equiveillance,” a state of equilibrium between the top-down power of surveillance, and the resistant bottom-up watching of sousveillance. Yet, this notion implies merely a balance in access to surveillance information, and is focused more on how to reach some kind of harmonious relationship with our rising surveillance society. With the informational voyeurism of Web 2.0, however, the goal isn’t to resist or come to terms with the power yielded by traditional surveillance, but rather to participate in a widespread and open sharing of the mundane details of one’s daily life. To give one’s peers a glimpse into one’s own personal universe.

These snapshots of the minutia of people’s lives have been compared to the Japanese concept of “neta”, the tidbits of people’s lives that are shared with family and friends as a kind of social currency. The Japan Media Review (an affiliate of Annenberg’s Online Journalism Review) recently made an insightful connection between “neta” and Web 2.0 voyeurism:

In Japanese, “material” for news and stories is called “neta.” The term has strong journalistic associations, but also gets used to describe material that can become the topic of conversation among friends or family: a new store seen on the way to work; a cousin who just dropped out of high school; a funny story heard on the radio. Camera phones provide a new tool for making these everyday neta not just verbally but also visually shareable.

As the mundane is elevated to a photographic object, the everyday is now the site of potential news and visual archiving. Sending camera-phone photos to major news outlets and moblogging are one end of a broad spectrum of everyday and mass photojournalism using camera phones. What counts as newsworthy, noteworthy and photo-worthy spans a broad spectrum from personally noteworthy moments that are never shared (a scene from an escalator) to intimately newsworthy moments to be shared with a spouse or lover (a new haircut, a child riding a bike). It also includes neta to be shared among family or peers (a friend captured in an embarrassing moment, a cute pet shot) and microcontent uploaded to blogs and online journals. The transformation of journalism through camera phones is as much about these everyday exchanges as it is about the latest headline.

Building on this Japanese concept of “neta,” I propose a new kind of “veillance” has emerged with Web 2.0 infrastructures: “netaveillance”. Netaveillance can be defined as the process of openly and purposefully providing an almost continual stream of the details of one’s daily life – the mundane, the profane, and the vain – through Web-based technologies, coupled with the ability to capture similar data streams from one’s peers. Netaveillance constitutes an emerging ecosystem of personal data flows – not the exceptional information meant to be protected from state or commercial surveillance, but the free and open sharing of the minutiae of our lives.

My conceptualization of netaveillance is, to be sure, in its most nascent of stages. Much work needs to be done to contemplate how it relates to existing theories of privacy and surveillance, how power relations between and among participants might still exist, how such data flows could be captured by state or commercial interests, and so on. Theorizing and understanding netaveillance is no small task, but it might provide a new language and framework from which to understand the informational voyeurism and related unintended consequences of the Web 2.0 phenomenon.

Whether you want to bring it up at a cocktail party is up to you.

The 7th Circuit of the U.S. Court of Appeals has ruled against a defendant who claimed that the surreptitious placement of a GPS tracking device amounted to an unconstitutional search. From the court’s decision:

The police had not obtained a warrant authorizing them to place the GPS tracker on the defendant’s car. The district judge, however, found that they had had a reasonable suspicion that the defendant was engaged in criminal activity, and she ruled that reasonable suspicion was all they needed for a lawful search, although she added that they had had probable cause as well. The defendant argues that they needed not only probable cause to believe that the search would turn up contraband or evidence of crime, but also a warrant. The government argues that they needed nothing because there was no search or seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.

So while the fourth amendment protects against unreasonable search and seizure, the court ruled that the placement of a GPS tracking device without the suspect’s knowledge does not qualify as a search of his car. The court equated GPS tracking to police physically following a car, or monitoring safety cameras to follow a car, neither of which amounts to illegal search and seizure. I completely disagree: see my various arguments on the issue here, and my article on the topic here.

[via GPS Tracking Systems blog]

TrackStick is a GPS tracking device featuring software integrated with Google Maps to enable tracking of oneself (I suppose) and amateur surveillance of others (more likely). The device records its location, time, date, speed, heading and altitude at preset intervals. With over 1Mb of memory, they claim it can store months of travel information. Downloading the data to their software allows the user to trace the devices activity via Google Maps and even Google Earth. The screenshot to the right reveals that a device was at a shopping mall on Sept 16 at 4:33pm and stayed there for 6 minutes.

The basic version looks like a typical USB flash drive. You can simply drop it in your wife’s purse or kids backpack, and they’d probably never know. The sales pitch touts various applications:

• Find where your kids have been
• Verify employee driving routes
• Review family members driving habits
• Watch large shipment routes
• Know where anything or anyone has been

The Pro version is meant to be permanently installed on vehicles and features tamper resistant labels so you know if your employee or loved one has become suspicious and tries to remove the device.

Amateur surveillance has never been so easy…

Unfortunately I’m much too busy writing the diss to provide any nuanced reaction (I’ll link to related posts below the jump). Suffice it to say that the word “privacy” does not appear in the Times article.

A Milwaukee police captain was walking through the District 7 garage over the summer when he noticed something wasn’t right about the satellite tracking antenna on the back of a squad car.

A closer look revealed that the small square global positioning system antenna was wrapped in aluminum foil.

Capt. Donald Gaglione called the radio shop and confirmed what he suspected: Foil disables the expensive GPS, essentially making the car invisible to dispatchers.

A check revealed that an antenna on a second car also was wrapped in foil. Gaglione ordered that every car be checked at the start of every shift and during patrols, according to department e-mails obtained by the Journal Sentinel under the state open records law.

Deputy Chief Dale Schunk, in charge of the patrol division, responded quickly.

“This sabotage of our equipment will not be tolerated,” Schunk wrote in an e-mail to all his commanders. He ordered that every district begin checks and that he be personally notified of other incidents.

The GPS trackers are part of an $18 million radio and communications upgrade the department has been installing since 2004. The department has added the GPS systems on about 25% of the department’s roughly 650 squad cars.

Dispatchers use the system to track the location of squad cars so they can send them more quickly to calls and to rush help if an officer is down.

Officers have quietly talked about GPS being used as a way for internal investigators to build cases against them. Assistant Chief Leslie Barber was fired two years ago after investigators put a GPS on his car and found that he was living outside Milwaukee.

Department officials downplayed the foil incident as a one-time problem that hasn’t resurfaced. Chief Nannette Hegerty called it a “non-issue.”

Asked why an officer might disable the device, Hegerty said, “I don’t know. Don’t ask me why some of the officers do what they do.”

Aldermen reacted with outrage.

“Are you serious? Officers are doing it themselves?” Common Council President Willie Hines said. “It is ridiculous incidents like this that bring the entire department under fire. . . . That is what you expect of kids, very immature kids.”

Ald. Joe Davis said the incident shows the need for the Fire and Police Commission, which received two investigators in the most recent budget, to closely monitor police.

“This type of act by law enforcement is unconscionable,” Davis said. “When we are looking for truth and integrity, what we are getting is unethical behavior.”

My friends in discourse analysis would have a field day with this, noting how resistance to workplace surveillance is considered “sabotage” and “unethical.”

I’m heading to Milwaukee today for the Thanksgiving holiday. I’ll drop off some extra tin foil at the local precinct…

…advocates of geotagging, like Stewart Butterfield, co-founder of the photo-sharing Web site Flickr, contend that linking pictures to maps can lend a new dimension to photography. For one thing, it can help people make some sense of the mounds of photos accumulating on their hard drives.

”The value may not be immediately apparent. But 10 years from now, nobody who’s geotagging their photos is going to regret it,” Mr. Butterfield said. ”Most people have just one or two or three iconic photos of their grandparents. Now people are going to have tens of thousands of photos, and when that happens, every little bit of context helps.”

Abstent from the discussion, however, are concerns over privacy, data-mining and the levels of surveillance enabled by these tools. My next project…

• GPS Surveillance Creeps into Daily Life (New Standard)
• Cellphone as Tracker: X Marks Your Doubts (New York Times)
• Phone service allows people to track their friends (San Francisco Chronicle)

I don’t have a lot of time to comment right now, but this excerpt from the New Standard article sums up much of my concern:

Koroknay-Palicz also sees long-term consequences of this monitoring.

“If we raise kids with no expectation of privacy, then they’re going to become adults and voters and people of influence in society with no expectation of privacy,” he said. “All the expectations of privacy are going to be eroded by the population of adults who grew up with no privacy and don’t see the problem with trading away privacy.”

Coney of EPIC agreed that parents are buying the “safety and security” sales pitch without evaluating the bigger picture, including who else has access to the tracking data.

“A parent might think this is a means to know where their child is,” Coney told TNS, “but it also may be recorded and retained by the person or the entity that provides the service, and they may use it for their own purposes, because there are no laws out there to… prohibit that from happening.”

The piece introduces new research – “the adaptation of defense technology” – to automatically count the number of people in a vehicle so road authorities can charge variable tolls based on vehicle occupancy. These new methods include counting heartbeats, listening for and distinguishing breath signs, sensing different levels of body heat, sensing human skin moisture levels, or (and I’m not sure how this would be implemented) reading passenger fingerprints.

Reaching into the car and searching the passengers in such manners introduce significant shifts in the norms of personal information flow in the context of highway travel, and steps must be taken to ensure these new technologies are designed in value-conscious ways. Santa Clara University law professor Dorothy Glancy agrees:

You can make data anonymous by policy and it’s just a matter of time before policy breaks down. You have to engineer [privacy] into the system.

[via Pogo Was Right]

The Times article does note the privacy concerns of amassing a large database of drivers’ locations and driving habits. One of the easiest ways to avoid these concerns is to delete the data after the necessary tax calcuations are made (although this would prevent the ability for users to question or audit their usage tax bill).

(I noted the privacy concerns of such widespread use of GPS in cars about a year ago, and CNet had some commentary then as well.)

Other technical solutions might be available that might better protect the value of one’s privacy on the roads. For example, instead of having an active GPS system monitoring the precise movements of one’s car, each filling station could simply download the most recent odometer setting to collect mileage data. Such data wouldn’t be location-specific, allowing more driver privacy.